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NOTES
Competition versus Cooperation: The D.C. Circuit
Referees the Transborder Policy
It is virtually impossible to make a phone call, watch television,
listen to the radio, or even deal with business data without coming in
contact with something that at some point passes through a satellite
transponder.' It is no wonder then that international telecommuni-
cations is one of the fastest growing areas of the telecommunications
industry and is playing an increasingly critical role in trade, foreign
policy, and international investment.2 The United States realized
early on the importance of world satellite communications and en-
acted the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Satellite Act), 3 to
usher in the new age in international telecommunications. 4 The Sat-
ellite Act provided for U.S. participation in an international network5
which eventually emerged as as the International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),6 a cooperative established
to further international telecommunications and to act as the sole
international satellite system for its members.
The general rule under INTELSAT is that its members must
route their international telecommunications through the INTEL-
SAT system.7 Such a rule has provided INTELSAT and its U.S. affil-
I S. BARNETT, M. BOTEIN & E. NOAM, LAW OF INT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 196 (1988).
2 Caplan, The Case For and Against Private International Comnmunications Satellite Systems,
26JuRIMETRICSJ. 180, 183 (1986).
3 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (1962)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 701-757 (1982)) [hereinafter Satellite-Act]. In 1985,
§ 701 of the Satellite Act was amended. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV 1986).
4 See Note, Analysis of the Legal Authority For Establishment of Private International Commiu-
nications Satellite Systems, 18 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 355 (1984).
5 See Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982) (amended by 47 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(d)
(Supp. IV 1986)).
6 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion, opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter
INTELSAT Agreement].
7 See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854. If a party
to the Treaty chooses not to route certain telecommunications through the INTELSAT
system and instead uses other systems, its proposals for such use must undergo an INTEL-
SAT consultation process.
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iate, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), 8 with a
virtual monopoly as sole providers of international satellite commu-
nications. Nevertheless, in the 1980s several inroads were made into
INTELSAT's hold on the international satellite market. 9 One of the
most significant policies that led the way towards competition with
INTELSAT and COMSAT is the U.S. transborder policy, developed
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
in 1981.10 This exception to INTELSAT's general rule states that
U.S. domestic satellites may be used for telecommunications with
neighboring countries when there is no current or planned INTEL-
SAT system capable of providing the proposed services, I I and the
use of any INTELSAT facilities would be impractical or
uneconomical. 12
The transborder standards were recently interpreted by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Communications
Satellite Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission (the Teleport deci-
sion).' 3 In that decision, the court upheld the well-settled trans-
border policy, and permitted its application to situations where the
proposed service is merely incidental to a domestic satellite 4 and
involves two-way communication' 5 with a noncontiguous state. Nev-
8 The Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was established under the
Satellite Act, Pub. L. No. 87-624, § 301, 76 Stat. 423 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1982)).
9 The transborder policy is one such inroad. The other major exception to INTEL-
SAT's general rule (that is not discussed in this Note) is the recently developed "separate
systems" policy. It originated in 1984 after a Presidential determination that alternative
separate systems were "required in the national interest." See Presidential Determination
No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (1984). The policy was formed in response to requests for
non-INTELSAT systems specifically constructed for international service. The limitations
set by the executive branch on the "separate systems" policy require: (1) that each system
be restricted to private-line systems not interconnected with public switched message net-
works; and (2) that one or more foreign authorities authorize the proposed system and
enter into consultation procedures with the United States under Article XIV(d) of the IN-
TELSAT Agreement. hI re Application of Pan American Satellite Corp., 101 F.C.C.2d
1318, 1327 (1985). For examples of applying the "separate systems" policy, see generally
id.; hI re Application of Orion Satellite Corp., 101 F.C.C.2d 1302 (1985).
For further discussion of the topic of "separate systems," see generally Caplan, supra
note 2; Sarreals, hiternational Telecommunications Satellite Services: The Spirit of Cooperation Ver-
sis the Battle for Competition, 26JuRIMETRICSJ. 267 (1986); Comment, Competition in Interna-
tional Teleconimunications: Alternative Avenues, 20 TEX. INT'i, L.J. 517 (1985); Note, supra note
4; Godwin, The Proposed Orion and ISI Transatlantic Satellite Systems: A Challenge to the Status
Quo, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 297 (1984).
10 See Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981).
1 1 Id. at 279-80.
12 Id. at 280-81.
13 836 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Teleport].
14 This is opposed to the more limiting view espoused by COMSAT that the pro-
posed competing service must be incidental to an already existing domestic service, rather
than merely a domestic satellite. See Teleport, 836 F.2d. at 630. Such an interpretation
would have had a limiting effect on the application of the transborder policy. See infra note
76 and accompanying text.
15 One-way, receive-only services are those that are already carried over a U.S. do-
mestic satellite system and can be received on a peripheral or incidental basis in a trans-
border location with the addition of a small, receive-only earth station. Two-way services
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ertheless, the D.C. Circuit defined some rather sharp requirements
for the FCC's application of the transborder criteria and severely
questioned whether the FCC could find the INTELSAT system "un-
economical" solely on the basis of cost disparity. This Note dis-
cusses the relevance of the Teleport decision in light of INTELSAT
policy and FCC precedent. The Note concludes that while the trans-
border policy has been effectively extended to new situations, it still
remains a narrow exception to the INTELSAT rule. With its deci-
sion, the D.C. Circuit upheld the flexibility the United States seeks in
international telecommunications policy, and at the same time pre-
served the U.S. commitment to INTELSAT and a global cooperative.
The United States was the driving force behind the commercial
use of international telecommunications satellites. 16 It accomplished
its goals 17 of establishing an international system through the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962, an act that remains the primary
embodiment of U.S. policy on satellites. The Satellite Act sets forth
a plan for constructing a communications satellite system with other
countries, and defines the U.S. commitment to an improved global
system facilitated through international cooperation and unity.' 8
COMSAT was created as the private, for profit corporation author-
ized to plan and operate the U.S. portion of the international sys-
tem,' 9 to lease channels to U.S. common carriers and other domestic
and foreign entities, and to own and operate earth systems. 20 The
are those that can originate in the United States or another transborder location for recep-
tion in the United States, and may or may not involve the extension of an existing domes-
tic network. In re GTE Spacenet Corp., F.C.C. 89-66 (Feb. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedcom
library, FCC file; 1989 FCC LEXIS 362, 3, 4).
16 See Note, Pirates or Pioneers in Orbit?: Private International Conimunications Satellite Sys-
tenis and Article XI'(d) of the INTELSA 7"Agreements, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 199, 201
(1986).
17 The goals for the United States in establishing world commercial use of satellites
were to allow developed countries to share in the benefits and costs of the new system,
lure developing nations away from an anticipated Soviet system, solicit goodwill by sharing
U.S. technology, and maintain the U.S. lead in satellite technology. See id. at 201.
18 The policy behind the Satellite Act is best stated by its legislative history:
The purpose of this legislation is to provide as soon as practicable for the
establishment, ownership, and regulation of a private corporation which
would be the United States participant in a commercial communications sat-
ellite system. This system is to be established in cooperation and conjunc-
tion with other countries and is to be part of an improved global
communications network. It would be responsive to public needs and na-
tional objectives serving the communications needs of the United States and
other countries and contribute to world peace and understanding
S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE AND CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2269, 2269.
The Satellite Act, as amended in 1985, now reads, "The Congress declares that it is
the policy of the United States as a party to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization .. .to foster and support the global commercial communications satellite
system owned and operated by INTELSAT . 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
'1) 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1982).
'2 47 U.S.C. § 735(a) (1985). An earth station is an "antenna, often saucer shaped,
electronically equipped either to receive signals from satellites, to transmit signals back, or
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Satellite Act made the FCC 2 1 the agency for regulating access to the
international system and for making rules for the operation of the
system.22
After passage of the Satellite Act, the United States immediately
began negotiations with foreign countries for an international com-
munications satellite network. These negotiations resulted in the In-
terim Agreements of 1964,23 which established a satellite system that
was finally superseded in 1971 with a permanent treaty creating
INTELSAT.2 4
The INTELSAT network has since grown into a strong organi-
zation. INTELSAT operates thirteen satellites that carry more than
half of all international telephone calls and virtually all transoceanic
television. 25 INTELSAT is a nonprofit commercial corporation of
114 member nations and provides international telecommunications
to 172 countries and territories.2 6 COMSAT, as the U.S. signatory,
owns the largest share of INTELSAT, holding down a 26.4 percent
share. 2 7 COMSAT operates in the international arena as primarily a
"carrier's carrier" between INTELSAT satellites and U.S. earth sta-
tions for carriers such as RCA and AT&T.2 8
INTELSAT is obligated according to its treaty agreements 29 to
charge a uniform rate for the same type of service provided on any of
its routes. This is despite the fact that routes experiencing heavy
traffic are more profitable, and those with little traffic are less profita-
ble and more expensive for INTELSAT to operate.30 The result of
to do both." Note, Bypassing INTELSA T: Fair Competition or Violation of the INTELSA 7"Agree-
ment?, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 479, 483 (1984) (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS,
THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ON SMALL BUSINESS, H.R.
REP. No. 1171, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 46 (1984)).
21 The FCC is an independent United States government agency, responsible directly
to Congress. It was established by the Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)), and is charged with regulating interstate and international com-
munications by radio, telecommunications, wire, satellite, and cable. Note, supra note 20,
at 480 n.4 (citing FCC, THE FCC IN BRIEF 1 (1983) (information bulletin)).
22 See 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1982).
23 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Commu-
nications Satellite System and Special Agreement, opened for signature Aug. 20, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. 5646.
24 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, 23 U.S.T. at 3813.
25 INTELSAT, INTELSAT ANNUAL REPORT 1987-88 I (1988). One such example is
INTELSAT's transmission of the 1988 Winter Olympics. Id. at 24.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id. at 44. The U.S. share of INTELSAT has dwindled in recent years from its 1964
share of 61% to its current share of 26%. Thus, its weighted voting has correspondingly
decreased and an international secretariat of INTELSAT staff rather than COMSAT man-
ages the system. See Caplan, supra note 2, at 188. Nevertheless, the U.S. share is still
considerable. For example, the United Kingdom is the next largest shareholder with a
14.2% investment share. INTELSAT, INTELSAT ANNUAL REPORT 1987-88 44 (1988).
28 Note, supra note 20, at 483. COMSAT has also been given approval for participa-
tion in domestic salellite communications as a retailer of certain services directly to end-
users. See Godwin, supra note 9, at 301; see also Caplan, supra note 2, at 184.
21) See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3823.
3o This is illustrated by the fact that tniform rates exist even though transoceanic
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these "globally averaged routes" 3' is to provide a subsidy to lesser
developed countries whose routes are used less and hence less prof-
itable for INTELSAT.3 2 This INTELSAT policy is consistent with
U.S. policy originally stated in the Satellite Act for directing certain
"care and attention" to less developed countries, 33 but nevertheless
makes it difficult for INTELSAT to compete effectively with systems
free to offer service only on the busier, more profitable routes.
Despite INTELSAT's commitment to less developed countries,
it has enjoyed great success as a communications network. Its suc-
cess is due in part to a basic rule in Article XIV 34 of the INTELSAT
Agreement: member countries will not utilize space segment facili-
ties separate from INTELSAT for meeting their international tele-
communications needs unless the member consults with the
INTELSAT Board of Governors3 5 to ensure the technical compati-
bility of the proposed facilities and to avoid significant harm to the
INTELSAT system. 36 The restrictions of Article XIV(d) seem con-
sistent with the goal of the Satellite Act to establish a single global
cooperative. 37 Furthermore, the Satellite Act compels the President
to make certain that the COMSAT system is the primary interna-
traffic over the Atlantic is six times greater than over the Pacific, and is three times greater
than over the Indian Ocean. Caplan, supra note 2, at 187.
31 See Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
32 See Caplan, supra note 2, at 194-95. For more information on INTELSAT's com-
mitment to lesser developed countries see Comment, Recent Actions of INTELSAT Benefiting
the Developing Countries, 15 J. SPACE L. 64 (1987).
33 See 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1982) (amended by 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (Supp. IV 1986)).
34 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, art. XIV, 23 U.S.T. at 3853-55. This Article
contains the rights and obligations for the members of INTELSAT and contains rules
designed to preserve the viability of the organization. See generaly Note, supra note 16, at
211-12.
35 The Board of Governors is responsible for development, establishment, operation,
and maintenance of the space segments. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, art. VI,
23 U.S.T. at 3824; art. X, 23 U.S.T. at 3840-45. It is composed of Governors representing
the Signatories according to formulas set out within the Agreement.
36 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 6, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854. The relevant
part of Article XIV(d) reads:
To the extent that any Party .. .intends individually or jointly to establish,
acquire or utilize space segment facilities separate from the INTELSAT
space segment facilities to meet its international public telecommunications
services requirements, such Party or Signatory, prior to the establishment,
acquisition or utilization of such facilities shall furnish all relevant informa-
tion to and shall consult with the Assembly of Parties, through the Board of
Governors, to ensure technical compatibility of such facilities and their oper-
ation with the use of the radio spectrum and orbital space by the existing or
planned INTELSAT space segment and to avoid significant economic harm
to the global system of INTELSAT.
Id.
The Satellite Act codifies the INTELSAT general rule into U.S. policy. "The Con-
gress declares it is the policy of the United States ... to authorize use and operation of any
additional space segment facilities only if the obligations of the United States under Article
XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement have been met." 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. IV
1986).
37 See S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1962), repinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2269, 2269.
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tional telecommunications system in the United States unless a sepa-
rate system is warranted by "unique governmental need, or is
otherwise required in the national interest."' 38 The FCC has also
stated its firm commitment to carrying out the purposes of the 1962
Act.3 9 As a result, domestic law, treaty obligations, and FCC prece-
dent generally require that international communications be routed
through the INTELSAT organization. 40
Despite these general requirements, the transborder policy pro-
vides a means for operators of domestic satellites to engage in ser-
vice to foreign points within the domestic satellite's footprint, or
coverage area. The policy, and appropriately the policy's name, de-
veloped from the FCC's 1981 decision in Transborder Satellite Video
Services.4 1 The dispute presented the Commission with the issue of
whether "public convenience and necessity" 42 required the provi-
sion of a certain transborder service over domestic satellite facili-
ties.43 The particular service was the transmission of U.S. television
programming to receive-only earth stations in Canada, Central
America, and the Caribbean. 44 To decide the issue on the merits,
the FCC had to decide whether the Satellite Act, the INTELSAT
Agreements, and U.S. international policy permitted the authoriza-
tion of such broadcasts. 45
In reaching its decision, the FCC relied largely on a State De-
partment letter from Under Secretary of State James Buckley that
made recommendations for the FCC's decision in the case.46 The
Buckley Letter provided that in "certain exceptional circumstances"
it would be in the national interest to allow use of domestic satellites
for "public international telecommunications with nearby coun-
39 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6) (1982).
•'3) Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 273 (1981).
4o Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
41 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981). The FCC decided Transborder along with two similar
cases. See American Satellite Co., 88 F.C.C.2d 178 (1981) (permitting operation of a Cana-
dian satellite system between the United States and Canada); Satellite Bus. Sys., 88
F.C.C.2d 195 (1981) (permitting U.S. domestic satellites to expand service to Canada).
The FCC had not ruled on a petition for transborder service over domestic satellite
facilities before the Transborder application because it felt it could not do so until it had
received official guidance from the U.S. State Department as to the position of the Execu-
tive on the petition and the foreign policy implications of the petition. Transborder Satel-
lite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 271.
42 It bears mentioning that there is no provision in the Satellite Act that requires the
FCC to take U.S. foreign policy or the INTELSAT Agreement into account when deciding
a petition. The FCC has consistently claimed that its "public convenience and necessity"
determination subsumes foreign policy. Godwin, supra note 9, at 311 n.4.
43 Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 271.
44 The FCC considered 11 transborder applications in this case.
45 Id. at 271.
46 Letter to FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler from Under Secretary of State James L.
Buckley (July 23, 1981), repiinted in Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258,
287-89 (1981) [hereinafter Buckley Letter].
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tries."'4 7 These circumstances would occur when INTELSAT could
not provide the requested service, or when the planned use would be
"uneconomical or impractical" if the INTELSAT system were
used. 4 8
The FCC recognized in Transborder that there was no existing
U.S. international communications policy precluding the use of do-
mestic satellites for transborder services. 49 The Commission found
that nothing in the Satellite Act precluded the granting of the peti-
tions, and that the Satellite Act itself contemplated the creation of
alternative satellite systems when necessary to meet U.S. needs. 50
Furthermore, the FCC held that authorization of these services was
consistent with the INTELSAT Agreements because Article XIV(d)
specifically provides for the use of non-INTELSAT space segments
by members for international public telecommunications as long as
certain requirements are met. 5 ' Finally, the Commission stated that
the authorization of the proposed services was consistent with the
U.S. domestic policy of taking a flexible, experience-oriented ap-
proach in dealing with new technologies and the telecommunication
needs of the U.S. public. 5 2
After establishing the legality of the proposed services, the FCC
applied the two step process spelled out in the Buckley Letter and
approved the requests. The FCC held that there were no current or
planned INTELSAT operations capable of providing the proposed
services, despite the fact that INTELSAT was technically capable of
doing so. The FCC further concluded that the use of any INTEL-
SAT facilities would be uneconomical and impractical. 53 This was
because "on the balance, the operational difficulties, increased costs
of facilities and services, and spectrum inefficiencies make the use of
the global [INTELSAT] system impractical when compared to the
alternative utilization of domestic satellite facilities." '54 The Com-
47 Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 288 (1981).
48 Id.
4'9 Id. at 272. The FCC acknowledged the Buckley Letter, but stated that while the
Commission was committed to supporting the global system, it was not precluded from
authorizing domestic satellites for transborder services by any existing FCC policy. Id.
50 Id. at 273. Section 102(d) of the Satellite Act originally stated, "it is not the intent
of Congress by this chapter to preclude the use of the communications satellite system for
domestic communications services where consistent with the provision of this chapter nor
to preclude the creation of additional communications satellite systems, if required to
meet unique governmental needs or if otherwise required in the national interest." 47
U.S.C. § 701(d) (1982) (amended by 47 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(d) (Supp. IV 1986)).
51 Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 274-75. See supra note 36 for
the relevant text of INTELSAT Agreement art. XIV(d).
52 Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 276-77.
53 Id. at 279-82.
54 Id. at 281. Specifically, the FCC concluded that the use of the INTELSAT system
for the proposed service would have required the use of "multisatellite hops, terrestrial
facilities and collocated domestic and international earth stations" which "would increase
measurably the cost of providing transborder satellite service." Id. at 280. This was op-
posed to the competitor's proposal which would involve little or no cost to the carrier or
19891
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mission conditioned the implementation of the proposed services
upon either the approval of INTELSAT after completion of the Arti-
cle XIV(d) coordination process, or upon agreement on the proposal
by the proper U.S. and foreign governmental authorities that the Ar-
ticle XIV(d) obligations had been met in good faith. 55
Since the Transborder decision in 1981, the FCC has approved,
on a conditional or final basis, over two hundred similar applica-
tions. 56 In 1986 the FCC approved in an almost routine manner an
application from two U.S. companies, Teleport International (Tele-
port) and American Satellite Company (ASC) to use domestic satel-
lite facilities to provide international telecommunications service
between the United States and Jamaica.57 COMSAT successfully pe-
titioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FCC or-
der granted pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act 58
and a Court of Appeals, for the first time, addressed the transborder
policy in the Teleport case of 1988. 59
Teleport and ASC petitioned the FCC to approve their proposal
to extend lines of communication by satellite for the provision of
nonswitched private lines between the United States and Jamaica. 6
Specifically, Teleport proposed to lease four hundred circuits on an
ASC satellite to provide two-way high speed data, voice, and video
services for U.S. businesses. The application was a scheme to permit
U.S. businesses to employ the less expensive Jamaican labor force
for information services such as data entry, telemarketing, and reser-
vation services.6'
programmer, and would require only the reception and redistribution of existing program-
ming. Id. If the service were carried on the INTELSAT satellite, however, the service
would have to be duplicated. This duplication was not cost effective and was not an efficient
use of the radio spectrum according to the FCC, and hence was "impractical" compared to
the direct satellite alternative. Id. at 281.
55 Id. at 284.
56 In re GTE Spacenet Corp., FCC 89-66 (Feb. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedcom library,
FCC file; 1989 FCC LEXIS 362, 2).
57 Id.
58 See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982). Section 214 of the Communications Act provides that
no carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or an extension of any line...
unless and until there shall have been obtained from the Commissioner (of the FCC) a
certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will re-
quire the construction ... of such additional or extended line." 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982).
') Teleport, 836 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
6) In re Teleport Int'l Ltd., I F.C.C. Rcd. 101 (1986).
61 Id. The Teleport/ASC proposal reveals the domestic and foreign policy implica-
tions associated with a transborder application. Teleport and ASC claimed that the pro-
posed service would:
I) strengthen the shared heritage and economic interests of the [Caribbean]
region; 2) create hundreds, and eventually thousands of information services
sector jobs in Jamaica, thus serving the purposes of the U.S. government's
Caribbean Basin Initiative and its overall interests in the economic prosperity
and political stability of the region; 3) make available to U.S. industry and the
U.S. public lower cost, more innovative information services; and 4) result in
an economic advantage to U.S. industry in the information services market
by increasing the export of U.S. goods and services.
THE TRANSBORDER POLICY
In their petition before the FCC, Teleport and ASC asserted
that their proposal was fully consistent with the transborder policy.
They argued that: (1) INTELSAT was not technically capable of
serving the range of customers that their service would, and in any
event, could not do so in an economically feasible manner;62 and (2)
the proposed traffic was not carried by INTELSAT, had not been
proposed by INTELSAT, and therefore could not economically
harm the organization. 63 The private corporations also had approval
for the services from the government of Jamaica 64 and from the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration, a
branch of the U.S. Commerce Department. This administration felt
that President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative required the pri-
vate system.65
COMSAT, however, filed a petition to deny the original applica-
tion. It did so on the grounds that the FCC application was inconsis-
tent with U.S. transborder policy. COMSAT stated that all other
transborder approvals involved service incidental to an already ex-
isting domestic service, 66 and that the approval of two-way commu-
nications between the United States and Jamaica would be
inconsistent with the policy. Previously, the only situation in which
two-way communication with the United States was permitted was
when it occurred with contiguous neighbors. 67
Despite the assertions of COMSAT, the FCC conditionally
granted the application, which went into effect upon the completion
of the Article XIV(d) process required by the INTELSAT Agree-
ment.68 The Commission stated that the transborder policy gov-
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 102.
64 Id. at 102, 103. The economic development agency of Jamaica stated that it did
not even begin discussions with the Teleport corporation until it decided that it was not
feasible for its signatory to the INTELSAT Agreement to undertake the proposed project.
Jamaica viewed the project as essential because of the new jobs and increased government
revenue it represented. Also, in the government's view, new companies that would not
have operations with Jamaica without the private system would still be required to transmit
all other communications'via the INTELSAT system. Thus, the non-INTELSAT facilities
would actually create new business for INTELSAT. Id. at 103.
65 Id. at 102. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration be-
lieved the proposed system fell under the separate systems policy. The FCC held the sepa-
rate systems policy did not apply to the petition. The Commission reasoned that the
separate systems exception dealt with the construction of separate international satellite
systems, and that it did not apply because the case involved a request to use a domestic
satellite for specialized international service within its footprint. The D.C. Circuit agreed
holding, "The separate systems policy was developed to deal with proposals for the con-
struction of non-INTELSAT satellite systems devoted to international service. As there is
no question of such systems in the Teleport/ASC proposal, the separate systems policy
has no application in this case." Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
6" In re Teleport Int'l Ltd., I F.C.C. Rcd. 101, 102 (1986).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 105. In 1987 the FCC issued final authorization for the application. See In re
Teleport Int'l Ltd., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 4149 (1987). In April, 1987 INTELSAT had decided
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erned the application because the proposed services were within the
footprint of domestic satellite services. The fact thatJamaica was not
contiguous with the United States was irrelevant. 69 On the basis of
cost disparity, the FCC decided that although INTELSAT could
technically provide the proposed system, it could not do so economi-
cally. 70 The FCC also found that the Teleport/ASC system would
ultimately provide services that INTELSAT would require a satellite
hop or the use of terrestrial lines to provide. As a result, an INTEL-
SAT system was effectively impractical. 7'
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, COMSAT argued that the FCC
approval of the Teleport/ASC application was an unexplained de-
parture from the prior practice of the Commission. In dealing with
COMSAT's sweeping assertion, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Buck-
ley Letter criteria and determined that the application was properly
considered under the transborder policy. 72
The court dealt first with the scope of the transborder policy and
its application to the Teleport/ASC proposal. The court stated that
the policy had never been precisely defined, and recognized that the
only limitations to the policy given by the Buckley Letter were its
references to "domestic satellites" and "nearby countries." 7 3 The
only other limitations were Commission decisions. The court held
that the mere fact that the proposed service went beyond the factual
circumstances of past approvals did not make it a departure from
prior policy. 74 Because the court found no indication that the FCC
ever rejected an application for service within the footprint of a do-
mestic satellite service, it could not find the FCC's holding that the
Teleport/ASC application was within the transborder policy to be
"arbitrary and capricious." 75
COMSAT also argued that the transborder policy applies only
to service that is incidental to domestic services already being carried
by U.S. domestic satellites. It argued this on the basis of the FCC's
statement in almost all transborder cases that proposals under con-
sideration "generally involve only the incremental expansion of do-
mestic satellite service or networks rather than the introduction of
new international services." ' 76 The court said that the term "gener-
ally," as it appeared in this standard boilerplate, allowed for the in-
that the application was technically compatible with the INTELSAT system and would not
cause the system significant economic harm. Id.
69 In re Teleport Int'l Ltd., I F.C.C. Rcd. at 103.
70 Id. at 103.
71 Id. at 104.
72 Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 630-32 (D.C. Cir.1988).
7" "Certain exceptional circumstances may exist where it would be in the interest of
the United States to use domestic satellites for public international telecommunications
with nearby countries." Buckley Letter, supra note 46, at 288.
74 Teleporl, 836 F.2d at 630.
75 Id. at 630-32.
76 Id. at 631.
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troduction of entirely new services in certain situations. The court
added that whether the proposed service was incidental to an ex-
isting service determines only whether the proposal meets the crite-
ria set out in the Buckley letter-it is not probative of whether the
proposal was within the scope of the policy. 7 7 The court held that
when the Commission used the word "incidental," it meant that the
proposed service must be incidental to a "satellite," not incidental to
a domestic "service." ' 7s Thus, the broader view taken by the FCC
was upheld, and the court refused to take the more limited view that
would have rendered the context of the transborder policy meaning-
less. 79 The court therefore concluded that it was not arbitrary and
capricious for the FCC to decide the case using the transborder
rationale.8 0
Nevertheless, the court did find that the FCC was arbitrary and
capricious in its application of the Buckley Letter criteria.8 ' First,
relying solely on -comparative price data, the FCC concluded that the
INTELSAT system was uneconomical. Second, the FCC failed to
consider INTELSAT's argument that it could provide service at a
lower price than that cited by the Commission. Third, there was no
clear showing by the petitioners that the INTELSAT service would
be impractical on grounds other than price.
According to the court, the holdings by the FCC that any IN-
TELSAT service would be uneconomical solely on the basis of price
"seemingly would open the door to full-scale price competition be-
tween INTELSAT and domestic satellite systems." 8 2 The court
feared that the FCC holding would result in every international route
being approved under the transborder policy when the route falls
within a domestic satellite's coverage and its price is lower than IN-
TELSAT's.8 3 As a result, the court was "hard pressed" in under-
standing how the FCC's finding could be compatible with the
Buckley Letter's objective of upholding the U.S. commitment to IN-
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. The court stated that:
COMSAT's "incidental to service" understanding of the scope of the trans-
border policy would, moreover, render the content of that policy meaningless.
If the only proposals to be considered under the transborder policy were
those that were incidental to existing domestic service, it is hard to imagine
that the FCC could ever find INTELSAT service to be anything other than
"uneconomical and impractical"-for if the services were already being pro-
vided domestically, extending it to another country could inevitably be done
without the duplication of facilities or multiple hops that would be necessary
for INTELSAT to provide the service. Only in the case of some new service
would the possibility arise that INTELSAT might not be uneconomical or
impractical by comparison to the use of a domestic satellite.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 632-36.
82 Id. at 633.
8:3 Id.
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TELSAT and the Satellite Act.8 4
Besides merely questioning the apparent results of the holding
below, the D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had clearly departed
from the prior practice of addressing the qualitative component of
the difference between the proposed service and the possible IN-
TELSAT service.8 5 Such a departure from prior practice was done
without reasoned explanation and was therefore arbitrary and capri-
cious. 8 6 In the past, an INTELSAT system was found to be "un-
economical" if it would require multisatellite hops and additional
terrestrial facilities, thereby duplicating programming already avail-
able on domestic systems and posing an inefficient use of the radio
spectrum.8 7 The petition filed by Teleport and ASC differed from
previous successful petitions because it was a proposal for an entirely
new system that could be carried by either INTELSAT or domestic
facilities without duplication.8 8 The Court of Appeals therefore re-
manded the issue for further clarification by the FCC and called on
the Agency to squarely address the question of whether INTEL-
SAT's service can be considered "uneconomical" simply because its
price will be higher than the proposed domestic facility.8 9
The Commission was also arbitrary and capricious in its total
failure to consider COMSAT's argument that it could provide the
proposed service at a much lower price than what the Agency had
assumed for purposes of weighing the cost of INTELSAT service.90
The court noted the apparent willingness of the FCC to give substan-
tial weight to the price submitted by Teleport, while it nonetheless
refused to credit COMSAT's argument that it could multiplex its cir-
cuits and effectively lower its price per channel. 9'
Finally, the D.C. Circuit criticized the FCC's finding that the IN-
TELSAT system would be "impractical," stating that the evidence on
the record did not support such a finding. 92 The court concluded
84 Id.
85 Id. at 632.
" See id. at 632-34.
87 Id. at 633. For how this interpretation was applied in the Transborder Satellite [idea
Senvices case, see supra note 54.
88 Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89 Id. at 634. The court, as already noted, seems to state that the FCC would have
great difficulty in squaring such a position with its prior precedent. See id. at 635 (Silber-
man, J., concurring).
So far the FCC has still not dealt with the issue of whether a finding that service via
INTELSAT is uneconomical can be based solely on comparative price data. In re GTE
Spacenet Corp., F.C.C. 89-66 (Feb. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file; 1989 FCC
LEXIS 362, 13 n.16).
9o Teleport, 836 F.2d at 634. The Commission's behavior was contrary to the com-
mand of the Buckley Letter which directs the FCC to credit information provided by COM-
SAT about the conditions under which INTELSAT service can be supplied. See Buckley
Letter, 88 F.C.C. 2d at 288.
'l Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
92 Id. at 635.
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that there was no proof for ASC's contention that its network was
already in place for nationwide service, while the INTELSAT system
would require a satellite hop or the use of terrestrial facilities. In-
stead, the court found that there was no apparent difference between
what Teleport and ASC proposed and what COMSAT claimed it was
in a position to offer.93
More important for the purposes of precedent, the court re-
jected the FCC's theory that a finding of "uneconomical and imprac-
tical" could be based on the fact that the use of the INTELSAT
system would require the domestic carrier, ASC, to use other carri-
ers, thus destroying a unified system.9 4 Rather, the court stated that
the relevant question under the Buckley Letter is not whether the
domestic carrier could provide the service via INTELSAT, but
whether the service could be provided by INTELSAT alone.9 5
Based upon the foregoing, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
FCC correctly considered the Teleport/ASC application under the
transborder policy, but failed to satisfactorily apply the Buckley Let-
ter criteria to the facts. Specifically, the Commission failed to ade-
quately explain its decision that a finding of "uneconomical" could
be based solely on comparative price data and the fact that the pri-
vate petitioner had effectively outbid INTELSAT.9 6 Because the
FCC's conclusions were not supported by "reasoned analysis" the
court vacated the Commission's order as arbitrary and capricious
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 9 7
The Teleport decision, in light of the court's conclusions, must be
viewed not as a radical departure from previous transborder policy,
but as a clarification of the policy and the bounds the FCC must op-
erate within to uphold the U.S. commitment to INTELSAT and the
Satellite Act. Given the FCC's history of flexibly defining when the
transborder policy applies, the D.C. Circuit properly included the
Teleport application within the penumbra of the transborder policy.
Thus, the court found that the transborder exception could apply to
a situation when there is a proposed service for two-way communica-
tion with a state not contiguous with the United States. 98 Also, the
court upheld the more expansive interpretation of the FCC that the
93 Id.
94 Id. at 636.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 636. Though the Teleport/ASC application was remanded for Commission
review, the applicants decided to withdraw their petition shortly after the D.C. Circuit's
opinion. On April 13, 1988 the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau of the FCC received
letters requesting the Commission to dismiss the application, and in May of 1988 he dis-
missed it without prejudice. In re Teleport Int'l Ltd., 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 3157 (1988).
98 Though approved by the FCC, the D.C. Circuit, and even INTELSAT, actual two-
way transborder service with a noncontiguous state has yet to come about. However, two-
way transborder services with Canada and Mexico have received final authorization. All
other transborder services consulted under Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement
19891
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policy applied where the proposed service was incidental to an ex-
isting domestic satellite, and did not require that service be inciden-
tal to an already existing domestic service. A contrary interpretation
could have severely limited the number of situations in which the
policy would apply. These judicial holdings attest to the flexibility of
the transborder policy and to the fact that the policy may extend to
more situations than many, including COMSAT, had expected. The
policy was thus given the potential to further encroach into INTEL-
SAT's territory.
Though the Teleport decision seems to promote a more expan-
sive reading of the transborder policy, it should also be seen as a
narrowing of the criteria required to effectively meet the policy.
Most significantly, the decision shows that the FCC cannot properly
grant an application solely because of a price differential between
INTELSAT's proposal and that of its competitors. The FCC must
instead address the qualitative differences between the services. In
addition, there must be some proof that the "use of the INTELSAT
system would significantly raise the cost of the services to the point
of being prohibitive," so that it would be doubtful that U.S. pro-
grammers would be willing to duplicate their networks over the IN-
TELSAT system because the cost of service would be so significantly
increased.9'1
The INTELSAT treaty and the Satellite Act both envision an in-
ternational cooperative promoting world peace by providing satellite
communications technology to all nations through the most effective
use of the radio spectrum and the geostationary orbit.l1° The Buck-
ley Letter embraced these goals while providing a limited exception
to INTELSAT's general rule, and did so in the name of efficiency,
practicality, and the FCC tradition for flexibly dealing with interna-
tional telecommunications policy. In the Teleport opinion, the D.C.
Circuit successfully walked the fine line defined by the transborder
policy between efficient and effective transborder communications
and a successful global cooperative in the international telecommu-
nications arena.
CHRISTOPHER W. DERRICK
have been one-way, receive-only services. In re GTE Spacenet Corp., F.C.C. 89-66 (Feb.
16, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file; 1989 FCC LEXIS 362, 3).
99 Teleport, 836 F.2d 623, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, j., concurring) (quoting
Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 280-81 (1981)).
1(( Teleport, 836 F.2d at 633.
[VOL. 14
